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Abstract
We consider an industry comprised of a multiproduct corporation that adopts CSR as a strategic managerial del-
egation and examine the profit-incentive to form a cooperative group. We find that competition is an equilibrium
for any degree of substitutability and yields the highest CSR, which is increasing in the degree of substitutability.
We also show that full cooperation is an equilibrium for lower substitutability but induces no CSR while partial
cooperation with one uniplant firm is an equilibrium for higher substitutability but yields lower CSR than that
under competition. Therefore, cooperation might reduce strategic CSR activities while competition will encourage
higher CSR but yield lower industry profits.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility (CSR); consumer-friendly activities; full cooperation; partial
cooperation; multiproduct corporation;
1. Introduction
In the last decades, business trend of corporate social responsibility (CSR) are expanding and the firm’s en-
gagement of CSR activities has become a global business practice.1As an academic response, the research debate
on the motives pushing firms to engage in CSR activities has been also becoming increasingly prominent.2 One of
the challenging strategy issues is the possibility of cooperation among competing firms in the name of CSR. In fact,5
firm’s CSR activities include investments in R&D, product design, advertising and the expansion of market shares,
which provide other channels through firms’ cooperation to create positive effects on the profits.
From the shareholder’s viewpoint, CSR is regarded as an instrument of the firm’s choice variables, which reflects
management’s incentive contract to engage in business strategy. For example, Starbucks increases its demand by
Email addresses: aru.gmtz@hotmail.com (Arturo Garcia), mariellealc@gmail.com (Mariel Leal), sangho@jnu.ac.kr
(Corresponding author) (Sang-Ho Lee)
1The global phenomenon that firms concern with CSR has been confirmed by various surveys, such as KPMG (2013, 2015) and UN
Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study (2010, 2013).
2Benabou and Tirole (2010) and Baron (2001) provided recent developments in business economics and explained the benefits and
costs of CSR. For more discussion, see Schreck (2011), Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012), Crifo and Forget (2015), Planer-Friedrich and
Sahm (2018), Wang et al. (2018) and Kim et al. (2019) among others. For the recent research in empirical and experiment fields, see also
Flammer (2013, 2015), Chen et al. (2016) and Nishitani et al. (2017).
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buying fair-trade coffee and tea from other organic firms and advertises heavily its consumer-friendliness. It enhances10
its reputation and image signaling concerns to increase firm value. Accordingly, from the profit-oriented motivations
for adopting CSR behaviors, recent papers in the literature of managerial delegation have formulated the model
of strategic choice of the degree of CSR and seek to explain firm’s strategic profit-maximizing use of CSR.3 They
showed that the aim of maximizing profits can be a motive for the firm’s engagement in CSR because the adoption
of CSR may increase the firm’s profits at the market equilibrium.15
However, these works assumed that industry consists of a few firms which hold a single plant. In fact, in the
real world many corporations comprise firms that produce various types of goods at various production plants.4
Typical examples include consumer markets for automobiles, PCs, and air travel, as well as business markets for
processed materials, computer servers, and various types of industrial machinery. These facts stress the importance
of investigating the market performance with a multiproduct corporation that produces several differentiated goods.20
To our knowledge, however, studies to understand how multiproduct firms strategically utilize the CSR-initiatives
are limited.
In this paper, we consider an industry comprised of a multiproduct corporation that adopts CSR as a strategic
managerial delegation. The corporation is a consumer-friendly firm that owns two production plants, each of which
produces differentiated substitutes and competes with a uniplant profit-maximizing firm in each market. We then25
examine the profit-incentive of a multiproduct corporation to form a cooperative group with other firms. In specific,
we introduce our model of exogenously specified groups in which the groups pursue their own interests subject to
incentive compatibility constraints. We then identify the necessary conditions of product substitutability when firms
choose cooperative group formation endogenously.
Main findings in our analysis are as follows; (i) competition is an equilibrium for any degree of substitutability30
and yields the highest CSR effort, which is increasing in substitutability, (ii) full cooperation is an equilibrium
for lower substitutability but induces no CSR, (iii) partial cooperation with one uniplant firm is an equilibrium
for higher substitutability but yields lower CSR effort than that under competition, which is non-monotone in the
substitutability, and (iv) cooperation between two uniplant firms is not an equilibrium. Therefore, cooperation
might reduce strategic CSR activities while competition will encourage higher profit-oriented CSR but yield lower35
industry profits. This finding contributes to the understanding of the role of profit-oriented CSR in encouraging
competition and forming cooperative groups. In particular, it is shown that competition can be endogenously
chosen but the multiproduct corporation will utilize CSR for inducing aggressive productions in both markets. This
3For studies on strategic CSR, see Goering (2007), Goering (2012), Kopel and Brand (2012), Brand and Grothe (2013), Lambertini
and Tampieri (2015), Fanti and Buccella (2017) and Wang et al. (2018) among others. For studies on environmental responsibility, see
Liu et al. (2015), Lee and Park (2019a,b), Chen et al. (2019) and Nie and Wang (2019).
4Kumar (1992) and Eckel and Neary (2010) point out that one characteristic of current economies is the presence of multiproduct
firms.
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result is consistently confirmed in a single-product homogeneous product competition in the literature of managerial
delegation with CSR activities.5 But, we consider a multiproduct market and show that CSR is monotonically40
increasing in product differentiation. Also, we show that a multiproduct CSR-corporation might have an incentive
to form cooperative groups with lower CSR than that under competition. It is also shown that the relationship
between CSR and product differentiation has an inverted U-shape. This suggests that detailed information about
a firm’s CSR should be taken into account if a government intends to encourage firms to be more competitive and
more consumer-friendly.45
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 analyzes a fixed
cooperation game and then Section 4 analyzes an endogenous cooperation game. Finally, the conclusion is provided
in Section 5.
2. The Model
We consider a market with a CSR-corp. and two uniplant for-profit firms, denoted by C, and F , respectively.50
They produce differentiated goods, denoted by 1 and 2. The CSR-corp. C has two plants. One plant produces good
1 and the other good 2, denoted by 1C and 2C, respectively. Regarding the for-profit firms, one plant/firm produces
good 1 and the other produces good 2, denoted by 1F and 2F , respectively.
On the demand side, there is a continuum of consumers of the same type. The representative consumer has a
utility function U(q1, q2), which is quadratic, strictly concave and symmetric in q1 and q2: U(q1, q2) = (q1 + q2) −
((q21 + 2δq1q2 + q
2
2))/2, where δ ∈ [0, 1) and qik is the output produced by firm or plant ik, i = 1, 2; k = C,F . Then,
the consumer maximizes U(q1, q2)− p1q1 − p2q2, where pi is the price of good i, q1 = q1C + q1F and q2 = q2C + q2F
are the quantity of good 1 and 2 respectively. The inverse demand functions are linear and given by:
pi = 1− (qiC + qiF )− δ(qjC + qjF ), i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2; 0 ≤ δ < 1 (1)
where parameter δ measures the degree of product differentiation. The products are regarded as substitutes if δ > 0
and independent if δ = 0.55
On the supply side, we assume that firms have identical technologies represented by the following quadratic cost
function: C(qik) =
q2ik
2 , i = 1, 2; k = C,F . Thus, the profit function of a plant or firm ik is:
piik = piqik − q
2
ik
2
, i = 1, 2; k = C,F (2)
and the profit of the multiplant CSR-corp. is:
piC = pi1C + pi2C (3)
5See, for example, Goering (2007), Goering (2012), Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Leal et al. (2018) and Garcia et al. (2019).
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We consider a managerial delegation model of the CSR-corp., in which the owner and the manager are separated.
To maximize the joint profits, the owner of CSR-corp. specifies an incentive contract with the manager. In this
paper the manager is assumed to maximize the joint profits of its two plants plus a fraction (θ) of consumer surplus
(CS) in production. Thus, the objective function of the manager of CSR-corp. is given by:
V = piC + θCS (4)
where CS = ((q1C + q1F )
2 + 2δ(q1C + q1F )(q2C + q2F ) + (q2C + q2F )
2)/2. Note that parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] measures
the degree of concern on consumer surplus when the corporation adopts CSR activities..
Our goal is to study how the different types of coordination affect the strategic choice of CSR effort and which
kind of coordination emerges endogenously. In the below, we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium under
four alternative market structures: (i) competition, (ii) full cooperation among all firms, (iii) partial cooperation60
between CSR-corporation and one FP firm and (iv) only FP cooperation.
The game runs as follows: In the first stage, each firm’s owner decides competition mode in choosing outputs
whether coordinate or not, respectively. Then, we have the above four different scenarios in the following stages. In
the second stage of the game, CSR-corp. sets up the managerial incentive scheme, θ to maximize the joint profits of
its two plants. In the final stage, firms decide outputs in each case.65
3. Fixed cooperation game
3.1. Competition
In stage 3, the manager of the CSR-corporation C chooses the outputs q1C and q2C that maximise eqn. (4). FP
firm iF chooses the output qiF that maximises its profit given by eqn.(2). Solving these problems, we obtain the
following:
qiC =
2 + θ(1 + δ)
8 + 7δ + δ2 − 2θ(1 + δ) , qiF =
2− θ + δ(1− θ)
8 + 7δ + δ2 − 2θ(1 + δ) i = 1, 2 (5)
From eqn. (5) we have that ∂qiC∂θ > 0,
∂qiF
∂θ < 0 and
∂qi
∂θ > 0. From, last inequality, we have that the market
output always increases with CSR effort.
In stage 2, the owner of CSR-corp. chooses parameter θ to maximize (3). Solving it, we obtain the following70
result:
Lemma 1. Under competition, in equilibrium:
θ∗ =
2(1 + δ)
11 + 5δ
; q∗iC =
2
7 + 5δ
; q∗iF =
5 + 3δ
21 + 22δ + 5δ2
pi∗iC =
2
21 + 22δ + 5δ2
; pi∗iF =
3(5 + 3δ)2
2 (21 + 22δ + 5δ2)
2 ; (6)
Note from Lemma 1 that:
4
a) dθ
∗
dδ > 0, this means that the CSR monotonically increases with the degree of substitution, and this effect is
weakened as the degree of substitution increases.
b)
dq∗iC
dδ < 0 and
dq∗iF
dδ < 0. Furthermore, q
∗
iC > q
∗
iF for any δ ∈ [0, 1).75
c)
dpi∗iC
dδ < 0 and
dpi∗iF
dδ < 0. Furthermore, pi
∗
iC > pi
∗
iF for any δ ∈ [0, 1).
3.2. Full cooperation
Under this scenario, in the last stage, the objective function becomes V + pi1F + pi2F , and firms select outputs
cooperatively. Solving this problem, we obtain the following:
qik =
1
5 + 4δ − 2(1 + δ)θ , i = 1, 2; k = C,F (7)
From eqn. (7) we have that ∂qik∂θ > 0, that is, the market output always increases with CSR effort.
In stage 2, the owner of CSR-corp. chooses parameter θ to maximize (3). Solving it, we obtain the following
result:80
Lemma 2. Under full cooperation, in equilibrium:
θful = 0; qfuliC =
1
5 + 4δ
; qfuliF =
1
5 + 4δ
pifulC =
1
5 + 4δ
; pifuliF =
1
10 + 8δ
(8)
where superecript ful stands for ‘full cooperation’. Note from Lemma 2 that:
a) The CSR becomes null when the three firms coordinate in production.
b)
dqfuliC
dδ < 0 and
dqfuliF
dδ < 0. Furthermore, q
ful
iC = q
ful
iF for any δ ∈ [0, 1).
c)
dpifuliC
dδ < 0 and
dpifuliF
dδ < 0. Furthermore, pi
ful
iC = pi
ful
iF for any δ ∈ [0, 1).
3.3. Partial cooperation between CSR-corp. and FP firm i85
Under this scenario, in the last stage, the CSR-corp. C and one FP firm coordinate their production to maximize
their joint payoffs: V + piiF , i = 1, 2; while FP firm −iF chooses the output q−iF that maximizes its profits. Solving
these problems, we obtain the following:
q−iC =
10 + θ − 2θ2 − δ(10− 4θ) + 2δ2(1− θ)2
40− 26θ + 4θ2 − δ2 (22− 20θ + 4θ2) , q−iF =
10− 9θ + 2θ2 − 2δ − 2δ2 (2− 3θ + θ2)
40− 26θ + 4θ2 − δ2 (22− 20θ + 4θ2) ,
qik =
8− 2θ − 3δ(2− θ)
40− 26θ + 4θ2 − δ2 (22− 20θ + 4θ2) , piC =
Ω
8 (20− 13θ + 2θ2 − δ2 (11− 10θ + 2θ2))2 , k = C,F (9)
where Ω = 4
(
155− 150δ − 60δ2 + 84δ3 − 15δ4)−4 (189− 213δ − 94δ2 + 165δ3 − 41δ4) θ+(151− 432δ + 51δ2 + 384δ3 − 180δ4) θ2+(
68 + 72δ − 164δ2 − 72δ3 + 96δ4) θ3 − 20 (1− δ2)2 θ4 > 0.
Now, from eqn. (9) we have that ∂q−iC∂θ > 0,
∂q−iF
∂θ < 0 and
∂q−i
∂θ > 0. Furthermore,
∂qik
∂θ > 0. That is, market i’s
output always increases with CSR effort.
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In stage 2, the owner of CSR-corp. chooses parameter θ to maximize (3). Solving it, we obtain the following90
result:6
Lemma 3. Let θ¯pc satisfies ∂piC∂θ = 0. Then, under cooperation between CSR-corp. and one FP firm, in equilibrium:
θpc = θ¯pc; qpcik = qik(θ
pc); qpc−iC = q−iC(θ
pc); qpc−iF = q−iF (θ
pc)
pipcik = piik(θ
pc); pipc−iC = pi−iC(θ
pc); pipc−iF = pi−iF (θ
pc) (10)
where superscript pc stands for ‘partial cooperation’. From Lemma 3 we have that:
a) dθ
pc
dδ
∣∣
δ→0 > 0 and
dθpc
dδ
∣∣
δ→1 < 0 , these results show that the optimal CSR is characterized by an inverse U curve
in relationship to the degree of substitution. In other words, the relationship between the optimal CSR and the
degree of substitution is non-monotonic.95
b)
dqpcik
dδ < 0 and
dqpc−ik
dδ < 0. Furthermore, q
pc
−iC
<
>q
pc
−iF if δ
>
<0.2595.
c)
dpipcik
dδ < 0 and
dpipc−ik
dδ < 0. Furthermore, pi
pc
−iC
<
>pi
pc
−iF if δ
>
<0.2595.
3.4. Cooperation between FP firms only
Under this scenario, in the last stage, CSR-corp. C chooses the outputs q1C and q2C that maximise eqn. (4);
while FP firms coordinate their production to maximize the joint profits: pi1F + pi2F . Solving these problems, we
obtain the following:
qiC =
2 + δ + (1 + δ)θ
(2 + δ)(4 + 3δ − θ(1 + δ)) , qiF =
2 + δ − (1 + δ)θ
(2 + δ)(4 + 3δ − θ(1 + δ)) , i = 1, 2 (11)
From eqn. (11) we have that ∂qiC∂θ > 0,
∂qiF
∂θ < 0 and
∂(qiC+qiF )
∂θ > 0.
In stage 2, the owner of CSR-corp. chooses parameter θ to maximize (3). Solving it, we obtain the following100
result:
Lemma 4. Under cooperation between FP firms only, in equilibrium:
θofc =
2 + 3δ + δ2
11 + 12δ + 3δ2
; qofciC =
2 + δ
7 + 8δ + 2δ2
; qofciF =
5 + 5δ + δ2
(3 + 2δ) (7 + 8δ + 2δ2)
piofcC =
(2 + δ)2
(3 + 2δ) (7 + 8δ + 2δ2)
; piofciF =
(
5 + 5δ + δ2
)2
2(3 + 2δ) (7 + 8δ + 2δ2)
2 (12)
where superscript ofc stands for ”only FP cooperation”. Note from Lemma 4 that:
a) dθ
ofc
dδ > 0, CSR monotonically increases with the degree of substitution, and this effect is weakened as the degree
of substitution increases. As in the benchmark case where is no coordination.
b)
dqofciC
dδ < 0 and
dqofciF
dδ < 0. Furthermore, q
ofc
iC > q
ofc
iF for any δ ∈ [0, 1).105
c)
dpiofciC
dδ < 0 and
dpiofciF
dδ < 0. Furthermore, pi
ofc
iC > pi
ofc
iF for any δ ∈ [0, 1).
6Proof is provided in Appendix A.
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3.5. Comparing CSR levels
Having solved for the equilibrium levels of CSR under the four scenarios, we now compare them and report the
following result.7
Proposition 1. When the products are substitutes, CSR effort is the highest under competition regime while CSR110
effort is the lowest when all firms cooperate in productions.
Proposition 1 shows that the strategic level of CSR depends on the market structures whether cooperation or
competition. That is, cooperation might reduce strategic CSR activities while competition will encourage higher
CSR. The economic explanation is as follows: In the managerial delegation of CSR where the managers take care of
consumer surplus, it will encourage the firm to produce more aggressive output production. Thus, it will yield the115
first-mover advantage in the output competition game. This fact is already well-known in the literature of managerial
delegation game.8 However, under full cooperation, this incentive will disappear. Therefore, CSR under competition
is the highest while CSR under cooperation is the lowest. This finding contributes to the understanding of the role
of strategic CSR as a profit-increasing device.
4. Endogenous cooperation game120
In the below, we analyzes an endogenous cooperation game where each firm’s owners decides competition mode
in choosing outputs whether coordinate or not, respectively, in the first stage. Then, we have the following table:
FP 2
Coordinate ”C” Not Coordinate ”NC”
FP 1 FP 1
C NC C NC
CSR-corp.
C pifulC , pi
ful
1F , pi
ful
2F pi
pc
C , pi
pc
−iF , pi
pc
iF pi
pc
C , pi
pc
iF , pi
pc
−iF pi
∗
C , pi
∗
1F , pi
∗
2F
NC piofcC , pi
ofc
1F , pi
ofc
2F pi
∗
C , pi
∗
1F , pi
∗
2F pi
∗
C , pi
∗
1F , pi
∗
2F pi
∗
C , pi
∗
1F , pi
∗
2F
The equilibrium outcomes are as follows:9
i) ‘Full cooperation’, that is, (C,C,C) emerges as an equilibrium if pifulC ≥ piofcC , piful1F ≥ pipc−iF and piful2F ≥ pipc−iF ,125
hold simultaneously.
ii) ‘CSR-corp. and FP firm 2 cooperation’, that is, (C,NC,C) emerges as an equilibrium if pipcC ≥ pi∗C , pipc−iF ≥ piful1F
and pipciF ≥ pi∗2F , hold simultaneously.
7Appendix B provides the CSR ranking under different regimes.
8For more discussion on this fact, see Lambertini and Tampieri (2015), Leal et al. (2018) and Garcia et al. (2019).
9Appendix C provides the profits ranking under different regimes.
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iii) ‘CSR-corp. and FP firm 1 cooperation’, that is, (C,C,NC) emerges as an equilibrium if pipcC ≥ pi∗C , pipciF ≥ pi∗1F
and pipc−iF ≥ piful2F , hold simultaneously.130
iv) ‘Only FP cooperation’, that is, (NC,C,C) emerges as an equilibrium if piofcC ≥ pifulC , piofc1F ≥ pi∗1F and piofc2F ≥ pi∗2F ,
hold simultaneously.
v) ‘Competition’, that is, (NC,NC,NC) emerges as an equilibrium if pi∗C ≥ pi∗C , pi∗1F ≥ pi∗1F and pi∗2F ≥ pi∗2F , hold
simultaneously.
Proposition 2. From the comparisons, we obtain the following results:135
(i) Full cooperation is an equilibrium for lower degree of substitutability but yields no CSR
(ii) Partial cooperation is an equilibrium for higher degree of substitutability but yields lower CSR than competition
(iii) Competition is an equilibrium for any degree of substitutability and yields the highest CSR
(iv) Cooperation between FP only is not an equilibrium
Proposition 2 shows that cooperation or competition can be chosen endogenously among the firms, but cooperation140
might reduce strategic CSR activities while competition will encourage higher CSR. This finding contributes to the
understanding of the role of profit-oriented CSR in encouraging competition and forming cooperative groups. In
particular, it reports that a multiproduct CSR-corp. might have an incentive to form partial cooperative groups with
lower CSR than that under competition, in which the relationship between CSR and substitutability has an inverted
U-shape. This suggests that detailed information about a firm’s CSR should be taken into account if a government145
intends to encourage firms to be more competitive and more consumer-friendly.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper considered an industry comprised of a multiproduct corporation that adopts CSR as a strategic
managerial delegation, and examined the profit-incentive of a CSR-corp. to form a cooperative group with other
firms in each market. We introduced exogenously specified groups in which the groups pursue their own interests150
subject to incentive compatibility constraints and then identified the necessary conditions of product substitutability
that the multiproduct CSR-corp. chooses endogenous cooperative group formation.
Our findings showed that cooperation might reduce strategic CSR activities while competition will encourage
higher CSR but lower industry profits. Therefore, competition will encourage the profit-oriented CSR while firms
have an incentive to form cooperative groups with lower CSR activities. This suggests that detailed information155
about CSR firms should be taken into account if a government intends to encourage firms be more competitive and
more consumer-friendly.
There remain some limitations of our analysis. We adopt a simple Cournot model of managerial delegation game
when we endogenize the strategic CSR-initiatives. We need to examine the analysis with an oligopolistic market with
price competition and compare the welfare effects of cooperation. Finally, recent analysis of CSR has been extended160
8
to incorporate environmental concerns and investigated the conflict of incentives in CSR. 10 These are future research
directions for real practice in CSR activities.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 3
∂2piC
∂θ2 < 0 for any θ ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ [0, 1). Now ∂pic∂θ
∣∣
θ→0 =
250+360δ−701δ2−459δ3+596δ4+135δ5−151δ6
2(20−11δ2)3 > 0 for any
δ ∈ [0, 1) and ∂pic∂θ
∣∣
θ→1 =
−306−18δ+447δ2−84δ3−181δ4+78δ5−6δ6
36(3−δ2)3 < 0 for any δ ∈ [0, 1). The fact that ∂pic∂θ
∣∣
θ→0 > 0 and
∂pic
∂θ
∣∣
θ→1 < 0 implies the existence of θ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∂piC∂θ = 0.225
Appendix B. CSR ranking
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Figure B.1
Based on Fig. B.1, the CSR efforts (equilibrium) in the different regimes are arranged in the following form
• θ∗ > θofc > θpc > θful = 0 when products are substitutes.
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Appendix C. Profits ranking
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(a) CSR-corp.’s profits
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(b) FP firm i’s profits
Figure C.2
Based on Fig. C.2a, the CSR-corporation’s profits (equilibrium) in the different regimes are arranged in the230
following form
• pifulC > pi
pc
C > pi
ofc
C ≥ pi∗C when 0 ≤ δ < 0.152094; and
• pifulC > pi
ofc
C ≥ pipcC > pi∗C when 0.152094 ≤ δ < 1.
Based on Fig. C.2b, the FP firm i’s profits (equilibrium) in the different regimes are arranged in the following
form235
• pifuliF > pi
pc
iF > pi
pc
−iF > pi
∗
iF ≥ piofciF when 0 ≤ δ < 0.28462;
• pifuliF > pi
pc
−iF ≥ pipciF > pi∗iF > piofciF when 0.28462 ≤ δ < 0.62591;
• pipc−iF ≥ pifuliF > pipciF > pi∗iF > piofciF when 0.62591 ≤ δ < 0.882995;
• pipc−iF > pi
ful
iF > pi
pc
iF > pi
ofc
iF ≥ pi∗iF when 0.882995 ≤ δ < 1
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